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4 
THE USE OF CAUSE CHALLENGES IN THE AGE OF PANDEMIC VIRUSES:   
IS A “CONCERN” OF GETTING SICK WHILE SERVING AS A JUROR  






The Coronavirus (Covid-19) has changed the way we practice law 
and every aspect of our lives.  Terms such as social distancing, remote 
learning, and virtual hearings are becoming the norm instead of pilot 
programs to show off technology in different circuits.  While like all things, 
this too will pass, it is inescapable that 2020 has left an indelible mark on 
the practice of law; this is not only true for contractual lawyers but litigators 
as well.  As such, this article focuses on the impact that the Coronavirus 
may have on how attorneys select juries, specifically, the use of cause 
challenges on potential jurors who fear getting sick as a byproduct of jury 
service.   
At the start, it is crucial to create a distinction between those jurors 
who are truly ill and those who have a concern that they will become ill.  
Obviously, if an individual is sick, most judges and litigants can agree on 
the individual's dismissal for both their safety and the well-being of others.  
However, before Spring 2020, if a juror feared catching a disease in a 
courthouse, they might have been looked upon as trying to avoid jury 
service more than a sincere concern for their health and well-being.  Yet 
with fears of pandemics and illness now a reality instead of the stuff of 
science fiction novels, fears of becoming ill through juror service may be a 
valid concern for many populations.  The goal of this article is to focus on 
this latter population. 
It is also vital to understand that with the arrival of Covid-19 being 
a unique situation, at the time of writing this article, little if any case law 
exists on the use of cause challenges against jurors who simply fear getting 
sick through service.  Indeed, the complete closure of courthouses grinding 
our judicial system to a halt is unprecedented.  There are no standards for 
 
    * Marc Consalo is an associate lecturer at the University of Central Florida in 
the College of Community Innovation and Education.  In the legal studies department, he 
has taught a variety of classes including trial advocacy and advanced trial advocacy as 
well as assisting with both the school’s moot court program and mock trial team.  He 
earned his J.D. with Honors from the University of Florida College of Law and his 
LL.M. with distinction from Stetson Law School in trial advocacy. 
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plagues and pandemics as an excuse. As such, this article will extrapolate 
from other instances where cause challenges were and were not granted to 
predict how judges will react to future concerns of getting sick. 
This article will review both federal and state laws regarding the use of 
cause challenges.  This review will include perspectives from both criminal 
and civil statutes as well as rules of procedures.  Next, a comparison of 
cases where courts have dealt with jurors who have “concerns” about their 
ability to serve will be provided.  This review will be key, as the population 
the article focuses on are those who have a “concern” they will become ill, 
not those who actually exhibit symptoms.  Based on this review of case law, 
predictions will be made regarding how judges will handle cause challenges 
against potential jurors fearing for their health.  Finally, suggestions will be 
offered to address this question, such as changes in juror questionnaires, 
modifications to current laws permitting automatic excusal, and even 
thoughts on pragmatic steps to take to keep everyone safe while visiting 
courthouses. 
 
I. CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSE CHALLENGES 
 
A. The Right to A Jury Trial 
 
Before one can begin to determine the legitimacy of cause 
challenges in our legal system, one must first understand the fundamental 
nature of the right to trial.  The importance of being tried by a jury of one’s 
peers can be seen as far back as the drafting of the United States 
Constitution.1  Article III Section 2 of the federal constitution requires all 
criminal cases be decided by a jury.2  Additionally, the Sixth Amendment 
to the United States’ Constitution grants those accused of crimes the right 
to be judged by “an impartial jury.”3 Some believe that the right is so 
embedded in American Jurisprudence that it originates in the Magna Carta.4  
The right was further expanded in the Fourteenth Amendment under the 
due process clause applying the obligation to state governments and the 
federal government.5    
At the time of its drafting, the Seventh Amendment saw the 
expansion of a jury trial to certain civil cases in federal court.6  These cases 
were significantly limited in scope and applicability.7 Yet we see now in 
 
    1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.  
    2. Id. 
    3. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
    4. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S 145, 151 (1968).  
    5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
    6. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
    7. Id. 
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practice that many civil matters are restricted to bench trials either by 
statutory practice or preference of the litigants.  In either event, the 
significance of a jury trial is an overt right revered by our forefathers cannot 
be underscored.  
Capitalizing on this importance, several state constitutions also 
guarantee a right to a jury trial.  For instance, in civil cases, forty-eight out 
of the fifty state constitutions specifically provide for the right to a jury 
deciding the outcome of a matter.8  The two states that do not provide a 
constitutional right to a jury trial in civil cases are Louisiana and Colorado.9  
However, Louisiana does provide for the right in its rules of civil procedure 
except under a few conditions.10  In Colorado, the right to a jury trial in civil 
cases exists under Rule 38 of Colorado Civil Procedure.11 
It is not surprising that all fifty state constitutions expressly provide 
the right for a jury trial in criminal matters.12  While the language of each 
individual jurisdiction varies, the issue centers more on what constitutes a 
serious offense under Duncan case law providing the right for only those 
offenses punishable by more than six months incarceration.13  For instance, 
in Alabama, the right to a jury trial for a criminal defendant applies for “all 
prosecutions by indictment.”14  While in Alaska, the right extends to all 
criminal prosecutions.15   Many states (thirty-three) choose to qualify the 
right by using the term “inviolate” specifically stating that the right to trial 
by jury in a criminal matter "shall be inviolate."16  Black’s Law Dictionary 







    8. Moses, Margaret L., What the Jury Must Hear: The Supreme Court’s 
Evolving Seventh Amendment Jurisprudence, 68 GEO WASH. L. REV. 183, 185 (2000). 
    9. Id. n. 10.  
  10. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. arts. 1731, 1732, amended by Civil Justice 
Reform Act of 2020, 2020 La. Sess. Law Serv. 1st Extraordinary. Sess. Act 37 (H.B. 57) 
(West). 
  11. COLO. R. CIV. P. 38. 
  12. David L. Hemond, Brief Review of Right in 49 States to Jury Trial for 
Minor Crimes, CONN. GEN. ASSEMBLY, (Sept. 28, 1998), 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/lrc/recommendations/1999%20recommendations/JuryTrial49Stat
esRpt.htm. 
  13. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159. 
  14. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6.  
  15. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 11. 
  16. Hemond, supra note 13.  
  17. Inviolate, Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019). 
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B. The Need for Full Attention 
 
Understanding an entitlement to a jury trial is just the first 
prerequisite in fully appreciating the importance of cause challenges.  The 
next step is to focus on what the jury should look like.  For this, one must 
dive deeper into statutes and rules of procedure.  Many states focus on the 
term “impartial” to avoid bias in a jury pool's composition.18  For instance, 
in Florida, Rule 3.251 of Criminal Procedure requires that the defendant be 
tried by an “impartial jury” from the county where the crime was alleged to 
be committed in criminal cases.19  In Alabama, the term “disinterested” is 
utilized when talking about jurors in cases involving guardianship. 
Further, in Pennsylvania, a civil rule of procedure permits a change 
in the venue when an “impartial trial” cannot occur in the proper location.20  
But one must understand that in defining the term impartial, a court is 
looking beyond just bias.  Indeed, ensuring that a potential juror is free from 
any sort of predisposition is important, but securing individuals who can 
also give the trial their full and undivided consideration is just as 
fundamental.  As such, the need for individuals who can sit in judgment of 
a legal issue focusing their full attention on the case, is paramount to our 
judicial system's successful operation.21   
This concern is evident throughout the rules and procedures 
governing juries.  For instance, in Federal law, a specific admonishment 
exists for jurors who may be so focused on note-taking during a trial that 
they fail to pay attention to the evidence presented during it.22 A cautionary 
instruction exists to be read by judges before the start of the lawyers’ 
presentation admonishing failure to utilize one-hundred percent focus on 
the goings-on during the case.23 “In a jurisdiction authorizing note-taking 
by jurors, even in the absence of a full instruction by the trial court that the 
notes taken by the jurors were not to be considered as evidence and that the 
jurors should pay full attention to the evidence as it was being delivered in 
court, […]”24  
Another example of the importance in Federal Law of the idea of a 
juror giving their full attention to a case can be found antidotally out of the 
United States Second Circuit Court of Appeals.25  In United States v. Hui, 
 
  18. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.251.  
  19. Id. 
  20. PA. R. C. P. 1006. 
  21. See Aldridge v. State, 222 Ga. App. 437, 437, 475 S.E.2d 195, 196 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1996). 
  22. 89 C.J.S. Trial § 935 (1955). 
  23. Id. 
  24. Id. 
  25. United States v. Hui, 64 F. App'x 264, 265 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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a female defendant was convicted of trafficking over two million dollars in 
food stamps.26   
During the trial, the judge admonished a potential juror for his 
failure to stay awake but did not remove him.27  “(T)he Court told the juror 
to give his full attention to the trial and warned that the juror would be 
excused if he could not stay awake.”28  In ultimately deciding that the trial 
judge made no error by not dismissing the juror, the appellate court 
acknowledged that the appropriate actions were taken to ensure the juror 
focused on the trial.29  The appellate court noted that a trial court has broad 
discretion in determining when a juror should and should not be 
dismissed.30   
Similar case law regarding the need for jurors to provide their full 
attention can be found among state courts as well.  For instance, in Allen v. 
State, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals addressed a defendant’s concern 
when he raised an issue on appeal regarding his jury being distracted by a 
peripheral incident preventing them from giving his case one hundred 
percent of their attention.31  Upon questioning, the court asked if anyone 
could no longer give the trial their full attention because of the peripheral 
events.32  No juror felt that the incident would draw their attention away 
from the trial, and the matter proceeded forward.33 On appeal, the reviewing 
court found that the trial judge adequately addressed the concern, ensuring 
that the jurors’ full attention remained on the trial.34  
Yet, the importance of juror’s focus has not just been a source of 
contention in criminal courts.  There have also been civil cases centered on 
a juror’s or jurors’ inability to concentrate on a trial.35  For instance, the 
Supreme Court of California addressed the topic in the case of Hasson v. 
Ford Motor Company.36  In that case, a nineteen-year-old college student 
sued Ford Motor Company in a product’s liability action for injuries he 
sustained when the brakes in his father’s 1966 Lincoln Continental failed, 
resulting in a horrific traffic accident.37  During an appeal, Ford Motor 
 
  26. Id. 
  27. Id. 
  28. Id. 
  29. Id. 
  30. Id. 
  31. Allen v. State, 300 N.W.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1980). 
  32. Id. 
  33. Id. 
  34. Id. 
  35. Hasson v. Ford Motor Co., 32 Cal. 3d 388, 411, 650 P.2d 1171, 1185 
(1982). 
  36. Id. 
  37. Id. at 1176. 
2021] CAUSE CHALLENGES IN THE AGE OF PANDEMIC VIRUSES 9 
Company claimed several errors, including juror misconduct for 
individuals failing to pay attention to the case in chief.38 
In its opinion, the California Supreme Court clearly equates juror 
inattentiveness to misconduct.39  The court wrote, “We agree with the basic 
premise that a jury's failure to pay attention to the evidence presented at 
trial is a form of misconduct which will justify the granting of a new trial if 
shown to be prejudicial to the losing party.”40 In this particular case, the 
assertion was that a juror was reading a book while witnesses were 
testifying.41  There were also allegations made by jurors against other jurors 
that some did crossword puzzles during the presentation of evidence.42 The 
accused jurors all signed declarations stating that they were paying attention 
during the presentation of the case.43  Interestingly, the declarations did not 
deny the distracting behavior. They simply affirmed that the behavior did 
not affect their ability to pay attention.44 
In rejecting Ford’s argument, the appellate court conceded that 
while there has been a universal acceptance that inattentiveness is 
misconduct, courts are extremely hesitant to overturn verdicts for such 
behavior.45  The appellate court listed cases of jurors who were intoxicated, 
reading newspapers, and even sleeping during the trial as examples of 
misconduct but where an appellate court did not overturn a verdict.46  
However, in the instant case, the California Supreme Court found that the 
statements made by the accused jurors were inadmissible under precedent 
and could not be considered by the trial court.47  Despite this conclusion, 
the appellate court still rejected Ford’s argument as it could not demonstrate 
that the distracting behavior actually prejudiced the Appellant.48 
In ruling in this fashion, the California Supreme Court reaffirmed 
two important concepts.  The first was that a juror’s failure to focus on a 
trial was misconduct.  However, that being said, the misconduct only 
mattered where the movant could establish that the behavior resulted in 
prejudice.  In part, it seemed where the distracting behavior that occurred 
in the trial’s progresses mattered as much if not more than whether it 
happened to begin with.  As the California court wrote in Ford, “It was not 
 
  38. Id. at 1183. 
  39. Id. at 1185. 
  40. Id. 
  41. Id. at 1184-1185. 
  42. Id. at 1185. 
  43. Id. 
  44. Id. 
  45. Id.  
  46. Id. at 1185-1186. 
  47. Id. at 1186-1187. 
  48. Id. at 1189. 
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clear what type of evidence was being presented while the misconduct 
occurred, or even which side's case was being presented.”49 
Therefore, while sacred, the right to a jury trial does still reside 
within the confines of accepted law.  The right does mean all parties are 
entitled to an impartial jury made up of individuals who will give their 
attention to the matter at hand.  As such, it falls on the attorneys in the case 
to ensure that the jury which sits in judgment of a specific matter is 
composed of individuals who can abide by this fundamental tenement.  In 
ensuring that such a scenario exists to protect their clients, the attorneys 
must utilize cause challenges and preemptory strikes to whittle the pool of 
possible down to the proper candidates.  But with preemptory challenges 
limited in number, cause challenges are vital in protecting this right. 
A connection to the roots of the current pandemic seems evident at this 
juncture.  If jurors must provide their full attention to a case for them to 
qualify as impartial, which serves as a prerequisite to fulfilling the promise 
of a trial by jury, any individual who cannot focus on the trial for fear of 
getting sick should be removed.  The question remains as to what the best 
tool is to delete these individuals from the mix.  Must litigators use their 
preemptory strikes to eliminate this fear?  Or is a cause challenge the correct 
and just method to secure a parties’ constitutional rights. 
 
II. CAUSE CHALLENGES 
 
A. Pragmatic Use 
 
In a nutshell, a cause challenge is a request to the court to remove a 
juror for a specific reason that prevents the individual from being unbiased 
to one of the parties in a case.50  There are many reasons that can justify a 
cause challenge, including bias, prior knowledge, or inability to serve due 
to outside influences.51  This is, of course, different than a preemptory 
strike.  The latter refers to removing a jury without providing a 
justification.52  Preemptory strikes are usually unquestioned unless race can 
be argued as a factor.53   
In our federal system, challenges for cause exist at both the civil 
level and in criminal matters.  Chapter 28 Section 1870 of the United States 
 
  49. Id. at 1189. 
  50. Challenge for Cause, LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/challenge_for_cause.    
  51. Id. 
  52. Peremptory Challenge, THE FREE DICTIONARY, https://legal-
dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/Peremptory+strike. 
  53. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). 
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Code governs cause challenges in civil cases.54  The selection process is 
further expanded upon by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 47.55  
While on the criminal side, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure Rule 24 
controls the process for selecting jurors in criminal proceedings.56 
At the heart of the ability to exercise cause challenges is the idea of 
questioning the jury.57  Indeed, the federal rule of criminal procedure starts 
off by empowering the trial court to “examine prospective jurors” or permit 
the attorneys to do the same.58  But while the use of preemptory challenges 
is typically limited in number, even the United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that no limit is put on the use of cause challenges numerically.59  
Instead, the limitation is in scope.60  Specifically, federal courts have stated 
that cause challenges are used in those scenarios where jurors disclose the 
existence of actual bias or implied bias.61  This was announced in the case 
of Jones v. Cooper before the United States Court of Appeals, Fourth 
Circuit.62 
In Cooper, a North Carolina death inmate appealed his denial of a 
Writ of Habeas Corpus.63  At the trial level, the proposed error focused on 
a juror who allegedly lied on her questionnaire and during voir dire.64  In 
rejecting the defendant’s argument, the Fourth Circuit specifically stated 
that the applicability of cause challenges is limited to instances of actual 
bias or implied bias.65   
In defining these terms, the United States Supreme Court has 
described the term actual bias as “that act to be ‘the existence of a state of 
mind, on the part of a juror, which leads to a just inference in reference to 
the case that he will not act with entire impartiality.”66  While an implied 
bias has been characterized as “a bias attributable in law to the prospective 





  54. 28 U.S.C.A § 1870 (West 2019). 
  55. FED. R. CIV. P. 47. 
  56. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24. 
  57. Id. 
  58. Id. 
  59. Gray v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 653 (1987). 
  60. Jones v. Cooper, 311 F.3d 306, 312 (4th Cir. 2002). 
  61. Id. 
  62. Id. 
  63. Id. at 308. 
  64. Id. 
  65. Id. at 312. 
  66. Hopt v. People, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1887). 
  67. United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 134 (1936). 
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B. The Good Cause Standard 
 
States have also gone to great lengths in providing guidance on the 
use of cause challenges.  For instance, in Washington State, Rule 4.44.150 
explains cause challenges in civil cases.68  The rule is somewhat 
straightforward classifying a cause challenge as simply “an objection to a 
juror.”69  Yet further guidance is also provided in Rule 4.44.190 of Civil 
Procedure, which provides a cause challenge for actual bias expressed by a 
juror.70 
In New Mexico, the legislature has created a statute regulating the 
selection of jurors in all trials.71  Here a distinction is made between 
preemptory challenges and challenges for “good cause.”72  While the statute 
itself does not define what “good cause” is, courts within that jurisdiction 
seem to provide some guidance on the subject.73 For example, in the case 
of State v. Baca, the Appeals Court of New Mexico, provided assistance on 
the term good cause when it affirmed a trial court’s decision to excuse some 
jurors who had been victims of past crime and keep others.74 
In Baca, a jury convicted a defendant of committing armed robbery 
and other offenses with a firearm after trial.75  During jury selection, several 
jurors indicated that they had been victims of previous theft crimes.76 One 
juror called “Eloise K.” described being the victim of a robbery twenty 
years prior.77  A second juror called “John K.” explained that he attacked at 
gunpoint twice in his lifetime and felt that law enforcement handled the 
matters poorly.78  Finally, a juror referred to as “Julie D” recounted being 
robbed in her childhood home when she was much younger.79  All three of 
these jurors were ultimately challenged for good cause, but the trial court 
only excused “John K.”80 
On appeal, the defendant argued that it was error not to at least also 
excuse “Eloise K.” from service as her prior experience as a victim of a 
crime qualified as good cause that she could not be impartial in the case.81  
 
  68. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.150 (West 2019). 
  69. Id. 
  70. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.44.190 (West 2019). 
  71. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-5-14 (2019). 
  72. Id. 
  73. State v. Baca, 804 P.2d 1089, 1093 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). 
  74. Id. 
  75. Id. at 1091. 
  76. Id. at 1092. 
  77. Id. 
  78. Id. 
  79. Id. 
  80. Id. 
  81. Id. at 1093. 
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In making this assertion, the defendant pointed out that on the record the 
juror initially said that she was inclined to favor the state.82  However, in 
ultimately denying the issue on appeal, the appellate court also noted that 
after a few moments to reflect, the juror stated, “she could make a decision 
based on the evidence heard in court.”83 
The New Mexico Court of Appeals explained that indeed “good 
cause” as contemplated by the statute could be met in a situation where a 
juror’s comments on voir dire could imply that they possess a bias against 
one of the parties.84  However, the possession of a bias alone is not enough 
if a juror can set aside his or her predisposition and render a fair verdict.85  
In these scenarios, good cause does not exist.86 
 
C. A Stricter Approach 
 
While many states choose to use broad and, at times, overreaching 
terms to define a cause challenge, other jurisdictions take a much different 
approach by trying to specifically delineate an exhaustive list of specific 
instances where a cause challenge is proper.87  One such jurisdiction is the 
state of Idaho where Rule 47 of Civil Procedure lists seven rather specific 
instances where a cause challenge must be granted.88  Granted, the sixth 
and final example provided in the rule is somewhat a catchall phrase for the 
court to metaphorically hedge their bets and provide wiggle room for a trial 
judge to excuse jurors when they do not pass a proverbial smell test.89  Yet, 
the five delineated examples leading up to the catchall are quite specific.90  
They include lack of competency on the part of the juror; familial relation 
to a party within the fourth degree; having a financial relationship with a 
party in the case; previous jury service involving the litigants; or possessing 
a pecuniary interest in the outcome of the case.91   
The danger with jurisdictions that take this approach is a tendency 
to use their legislation as a sword rather than a shield to prevent cause 
challenges from occurring.  Meaning that courts should err on the side of 
excusing jurors who may be biased as opposed to keeping jurors on when 
a doubt exists.  This is a concern that the Supreme Court of Utah recognized 
 
  82. Id. at 1092. 
  83. Id. 
  84. Id. at 1093. 
  85. Id. 
  86. Id. 
  87. I.R.C.P. 47 
  88. Id. 
  89. Id. 
  90. Id. 
  91. Id. 
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in the case of State v. Carter.92 In Carter, the defendant was convicted of 
first-degree murder with a firearm and sentenced to death.93  After a second 
jury returned a verdict in favor of death because of an issue with an 
erroneous jury instruction read to the first panel, the defendant raised 
several issues on appeal, including the trial court's failure to excuse three 
jurors for cause.94  Ultimately, Carter’s conviction was affirmed, as was the 
sentence of death.95 
During the penalty phase of his case, the defendant requested that 
three jurors be excused for cause.96  Those requests were denied, and he 
was forced to use preemptory challenges to remove them.97  He argued that 
these denials were improper and that the exhaustion of his preemptory 
challenges prejudiced him in the penalty phase.98 Ultimately, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the defendant did not meet his burden on the 
issue and sustained his conviction and sentence.99  Despite this conclusion, 
the court took the opportunity to admonish trial judges about the purpose 
of cause challenges.100  In writing their opinion, the judges for the Utah 
Supreme Court stated, “(w)hile the abuse-of-discretion standard of review 
affords trial courts wide latitude in making their for-cause determinations, 
we are troubled by their tendency to “push the edge of the envelope, […]”101 
The court focused heavily on death penalty cases in its analysis.102  
However, its words were quite forceful and provided guidance on the 
ultimate purpose of challenges for cause.103  Clearly, the highest court Utah 
was sounding an alarm that if sincere apprehension regarding bias about 
jurors exists, proper protocol is to remove them at once so as not to even 
risk their bias from tainting the ultimate outcome from a case.104 “If a party 
raises legitimate questions as to a potential juror's beliefs, biases, or 
physical ability to serve, the potential juror should be struck for cause, even 
where it would not be legally erroneous to refuse.”105 
 
  92. State v. Carter, 888 P.2d 629, 650 (Utah 1995) (while it is important to 
note that this case was superseded by statute by Archuleta v. Galetka, 67 P.3d 232 (Utah 
2011) the case is still sound for the principle it is being cited for in this article). 
  93. Id. at 633. 
  94. Id. 
  95. Id. 
  96. Id. at 649. 
  97. Id. 
  98. Id. 
  99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
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So important is this concept that it can also be seen in language 
included in the Utah’s advisory committee notes for the rule itself.106  The 
committee reminds judges that it is their job to find the correct “balance” in 
a jury panel absent concerns of time or efficiency.107  Nor should the judge 
take it upon him or herself to inquire of a potential only to get the answer 
needed to justify their presence on the case.108 It is not a trial judge’s job to 
rehabilitate jurors who expressed bias either for or against a part.109  Rather 
the judge is the referee ensuring that both sides have a meaningful 
opportunity to question prospective jurors to truly obtain an impartial jury 
of one’s peers.110 
 
D. Middle of the Road 
 
There are a few states that take a more middle of the road approach, 
trying to explain cause challenges while at the same time leaving broad 
discretion for the trial judge.  A perfect example of this scenario can be 
found in Texas, specifically, Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 228.111  It 
defines cause challenges as an objection to a juror based upon a belief 
grounded in the law that “disqualifies” a juror.112  Yet the belief must be 
sustained by the trial judge with a determination that it renders the juror 
unfit to serve in that specific case.113  Ultimately, the judge’s decision is not 
limited based only on what the juror says but on all evidence presented on 
the issue of bias.114  However, like most standards broad discretion is placed 
in the hands of the trial judge.115 
Many cases in Texas have established this concept as precedent for 
handling cause challenges.  For instance, in the case of Gant v. Dumat Glass 
and Mirror, Inc., a Court of Appeals from Amarillo, Texas restated this 
principle when affirming a lower court’s decision not to strike a juror for 
cause.116  Here the appellate had sued the defendant when one of its 
business trucks rear-ended Gant while stopped at a traffic light.117  
 









115. Gant v. Dumas Glass & Mirror, Inc., 935 S.W.2d 202, 207 (Tex. App. 
1996). 
116. Id. at 204. 
117. Id.at 205. 
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Ultimately, Gant succeeded at trial being awarded a little over $75,000.00 
in compensatory damages.118 
Unhappy with the amount of the award, Gant appealed on several 
grounds including an error in jury selection.119  He asserted that three jurors 
who expressed bias against decisions for mental anguish served over his 
demand for cause challenges against them. 120  He also argued that a fourth 
juror should have been removed for cause because of a friendship he had 
with the driver of the defendant’s vehicle.121 
In rendering its opinion, the appellate court pointed out a laundry 
list of automatic reasons for disqualification found within Texas Statute 
Section 61.05.122  This includes such items as being a witness in the case or 
being related to a party.123  However, the court further explained that while 
this list was provided as guidance, it was by no means exhaustive.124  The 
trial court still could find the existence of bias in a juror adequate enough 
to warrant removal for cause.125  Clearly, Texas had reserved ultimate 
authority and responsibility for an impartial jury to the trial judge.126  
The appellate court recognized implicit in rules regarding 
preemptory challenges was the understanding that all people carry with 
them preconceived notions and bias into a courtroom.127  However, just 
because this is the case does not mean those individuals cannot sit and hear 
a specific matter.128  Indeed, if that were true, no one could ever serve as a 
juror, and our justice system would fall to pieces.  In citing the case of 
Connie v. Hampton the Texas court noted, “(t)he usual meaning of ‘bias’ is 
an inclination toward one side of an issue rather than the other; but, as used 
in relation to disqualification of a prospective juror, it must appear that the 
state of mind of the panelist leads to the natural inference that he or she will 
not or did not act with impartiality.”129  Therefore, it is incumbent upon the 
questioning attorney to ask pointed questions to find this inability to act 
impartially.130 
In Gant, the opinion focuses in some detail on trial counsel’s 
inability to probe the jury properly to determine the existence of bias as it 
 
118. Id. 
119. Id. at 204. 
120. Id. at 205. 
121. Id. 
122. Id. 
123. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 62.105 (West 1996). 
124. Gant, 935 S.W. at 207. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 




2021] CAUSE CHALLENGES IN THE AGE OF PANDEMIC VIRUSES 17 
came to their beliefs on awards for mental anguish.131  The court found that 
the attorney’s “vague” and “legally insufficient” definition of the term 
ultimately resulted in answers from potential jury members that did not 
provide the appellate grounds for reversing the trial court’s decision on 
cause challenges.132 An inability to adequately ask the correct question will 
not uncover actual or implied bias.133  Because of this error on the part of 
trial counsel, ultimately, the trial judge properly denied the appellant’s 
contention regarding error in the instant case.134 
Regarding the juror who expressed friendship with the employee of 
the defendant, the appellate court found that trial counsel did properly 
inquire regarding potential bias because of the relationship.135  On voir dire, 
the juror explained that he rented a house from the employee approximately 
eight years before.136  He characterized their affiliation as “just friends,” 
noting that they would waive to each other on the street.137  Yet when 
pressed if the potential juror could be objective to both sides, he responded 
in the affirmative indicating, “I think I could be fair to both parties.”138  
Based on this response, the trial judge denied Gant’s cause challenge.139 
The appellate court again concluded that the cause decision was 
proper.140  In doing so, a comparison between the questions asked of jurors 
over mental anguish versus friendship was drawn.141  While the court 
concludes that this time, trial counsel asked the right questions, it was the 
juror’s response that he could be fair that was determinable.142  Again, 
citing the deference provided to the trial judge who can observe and critic 
the demeanor of the individual when providing the answer, the appellate 
court believed the juror’s response demonstrated fairness and an ability to 
follow the law.143 
Returning to the idea of questioning because of concerns focused 
around a pandemic, the specific approach taken by a state could play a 
crucial role in whether a cause challenge would be granted.  Whether a 
judge looks at the reasoning behind the request through a narrow lens or 
one much wider such as “good cause” could ultimately decide whether a 
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juror leaves or remains in the pool.  Yet, a universal takeaway is that no 
matter the jurisdiction’s approach, it falls on the attorneys conducting the 
voir dire to ask the right questions. 
 
III. DEALING WITH THE JUROR’S CONCERN 
 
A. The Judge’s Role 
 
With a clear understanding of the right to an impartial jury and the 
use of cause challenges to achieve that goal stated, the focus now shifts to 
instances where the grounds for bias are less clear.  As stated previously, 
the crux of this paper is not on those jurors who are ill but those jurors who 
have a concern regarding becoming ill.  Therefore, understanding case law 
where jurors have expressed concern over impartiality, although the 
concern may not be rational or scientifically based, is crucial. 
One consistent type of case that focuses on juror’s concern over 
more concrete forms of bias can be found in death penalty cases.144  This is 
seen frequently in attempting to sit jurors who are open to imposing the 
death penalty.  It falls to the attorneys trying the case to create a panel of 
individuals who will make a determination of life versus death based upon 
the evidence presented.  Yet during voir dire, trial judges are often 
presented with jurors who have concerns or are unsure that they can impose 
the death penalty.  In these instances, it falls to the trial courts to determine 
the legitimacy of these concerns on a case-by-case basis. 
For instance, in U.S. v. Sampson, the United States Appeal’s Court 
for the First Circuit reviewed this exact scenario.145 Decided in 2007, 
Sampson was noted as a landmark case in that it provided the First Circuit 
the unusual opportunity to review a death sentence imposed by the federal 
government.146   
On appeal, several grounds were raised.147  Of these, one focused 
on the dismissal of six potential jurors for cause sustained by the trial 
judge.148  All six individuals vocalized concerns about imposing the death 
penalty.149  The appellate court began by stating the abuse of discretion 
standard it would use to determine if the trial judge correctly removed the 
potential jurors.150  It then cited the standard used to determine bias in 
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federal court.151  Citing Adam v. Texas, the First Circuit concluded that in 
those instances where a person’s thoughts on the death penalty “would 
prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in 
accordance with his instructions and his oath,” dismissal was 
appropriate.152 
In Sampson, varying statements were made by the six struck jurors 
regarding their thoughts on the death penalty.153  While most of the attacked 
challenges appeared self-evident on the record (four jurors answered on 
questionnaires that they were strongly opposed to the death penalty and 
could not impose it), two jurors seemed to waffle on their responses.154  
Juror 14 made comments that “she did not know” and “she was very 
concerned” that she could not impose death as a sentence.155  While Juror 
28 remarked during voir dire that she “did not think” she could impose 
death for someone who was mentally ill.156 
In affirming the trial court’s decision to strike Juror 14 and Juror 28, 
the First Circuit reflected on the fact that every time a trial judge strikes a 
juror for cause, he or she is exercising a degree of discretion.157  It lamented 
that in instances where potential jurors are not positive over their concerns 
to serve there is no magic formula to use nor crystal ball to employ.158  As 
the appellate court remarked, when an individual is “near the margins, on-
the-spot judgment plays an important part in screening out those whose 
ability to serve may be compromised.”159  With Juror 14 and Juror 28, the 
trial judge did not abuse his discretion in granting the request to strike even 
though the objections to imposing death were less concrete than that of clear 
bias.160 
 
B. The Juror’s Words 
 
Yet this litmus test is neither limited to the federal courts nor 
criminal cases.  In Bell v. Vanlandingham, the Alabama Supreme Court 
encountered a similar issue in reviewing a medical malpractice case where 
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to permit cause challenges on three potential jurors who expressed concerns 
about the ability to be fair.162 
The first juror, Wood, was a pastor in the local community.163  He 
was neither a patient of the physician in the past or present.164  However, 
he did express concerns about being impartial because other members of 
his congregation were patients.165  He would minister to them at the hospital 
where the doctor worked.166  This made him feel “a little uncomfortable” 
sitting on the jury.167 
The second juror, Turk, while not a current patient of the doctor had 
been a patient previously.168  Yet he had also hunted with the plaintiff in 
the case in the past as well.  As such, he had contact with both sides of the 
lawsuit.169  Yet unlike Wood, Turk unequivocally indicated that he could 
be impartial in the case.170 
The third and final juror was Kornegay.171  She explained during 
voir dire that Dr. Vanlandingham served as the physician for her family.172  
Because of this relationship, she did not want to sit on the jury.173  
Specifically, she stated that she felt “awkward” hearing the case and finding 
a verdict.174 
In rendering its decision, the Alabama Supreme Court again 
reiterated the robust discretion that the trial judge who observes the 
potential jurors has in these instances.175  Citing previous precedent found 
in Roberts v. Hutchins, the court wrote, “that a trial judge is given broad 
discretion in regard to sustaining or denying a challenge for cause, and 
[that] his decision is therefore entitled to great weight and will not be 
interfered with unless it is clearly erroneous and equivalent to an abuse of 
discretion.”176  While under Alabama case law a doctor-patient relationship 
is prima facie evidence of bias, the ultimate decision still resides in the trial 
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In the Vanlandingham case, juror Turk clearly made statements that 
the relationship he had with both parties would play no role in his decision 
process.178  Therefore, the appellate court quickly concluded that it was not 
error to deny a cause challenge on him.179  However, jurors Wood and 
Kornegay posed greater distress.180  In focusing on Wood, the exact 
wording of how his concern was voiced played a decisive role in the 
Alabama Supreme Court finding that there was no error to deny the cause 
challenged against him.181  Wood said he would feel “a little 
uncomfortable” if he had to sit on the panel.182  In the court’s view, a slight 
discomfort did not rise to the level of overturning the trial judge’s decision 
not to strike the juror for cause remembering the broad discretion trial 
judge’s had on these decisions.183 
However, the Alabama Supreme Court did find juror Kornegay’s 
hesitation in serving was expressed in a fashion that warranted a reversal of 
the trial court’s decision.184  In finding that it was error to deny the cause 
challenge against her, the appellate judges narrowed in on her use of the 
term “awkward.”185  Such terminology had been found in a previous case 
to warrant a cause challenge when a juror responded that she “would feel 
‘awkward’ returning to her doctor for treatment if she served on the jury in 
a medical malpractice action against him.”186  Therefore, while precedent 
did not recognize the term “uncomfortable” as justification for juror 
removal, it did believe the term “awkward” warranted exclusion.187 
As such, it is clear that a juror’s concern is enough to warrant a cause 
challenge in some instances.  However, the way that the concern is 
expressed plays an important role in the ultimate determination of whether 
the cause challenge will be sustained or denied.  Time after time the clear 
message appellate courts are sending is the authority of the trial judge to 
make a decision on the veracity and authenticity of the concern is 
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IV. LEGITIMACY OF WORRY 
 
A. Lack of Rationality of Concern 
 
Yet until recently many would consider falling ill because of 
exposure to others during jury service an illegitimate concern no matter 
how it was phrased.  As stated previously, the issue of whether catching the 
Coronavirus while serving as a juror had not been reported on before.  Yet 
potential guidance can be found in past cases dealing with jurors who may 
have expressed hesitation in serving on panels when that hesitation was 
potentially lacking merit. 
One interesting federal case on the legitimacy of a juror’s concern 
can be found out of the Western District of Oklahoma in the decision of 
Morris v. Workman.188   
During the case, one of the jurors, Myers, noticed that the Petitioner 
was taking copious notes of all the going’s-on that were occurring.189  
Myers became nervous because he thought that during voir dire he would 
be forced to reveal personal information about himself such as his 
address.190  Because he additionally believed that the Petitioner was 
charged with criminal activity that was gang related, he became fearful that 
if his address was disclosed there would be potential retaliation against he 
and/or his family by someone in the Petitioner’s gang.191  While there was 
absolutely no evidence to suggest such a conclusion, the juror shared his 
concerns with the bailiff, who promptly reported the matter to the trial 
judge.192 
In speaking with Myers, the trial judge took great pains to not only 
determine if these concerns would affect the juror’s ability to be fair but if 
for any reason if these concerns had been shared with others in the venire 
infecting them as well.193 Fortunately, during the inquiry, Myers denied 
both concerns.194  He emphatically responded to his duty of being impartial 
by stating, “that’s what I am going to do.”195  Because of the judge’s 
thorough job in exploring potential bias affecting the trial, the magistrate’s 
report and recommendation was affirmed.196 
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Interestingly, in ruling in this fashion the Oklahoma Federal District 
Court cited the United States Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Gagnon. 197 
Here the concern that had been expressed was that a juror thought that a 
defendant in a drug trafficking trial had been drawing pictures of the jurors 
during the proceedings.198  When asked by the court outside the presence 
of the jury if Gagnon had been engaging in such conduct, he reported he 
had as he was an artist and this was how he calmed himself.199  Nonetheless, 
the judge ordered him to cease the behavior immediately.200  While no 
intimidation motive was found, one of the attorneys asked the judge to 
inquire if the juror could no longer be impartial.201 
The court decided to have the conversation with the individual juror 
outside the presence of the parties in his chambers.202  While questioning 
the juror about his concern, the juror stated, “... I just thought that perhaps 
because of the seriousness of the trial, and because of-whichever way the 
deliberations go, it kind of-it upset me, because of what could happen 
afterward.”203  Based on this statement, the judge further pressed if the juror 
could remain on the case and be impartial.204  Satisfied with his answers, 
the judge permitted the juror to continue on the panel.205 In ruling against 
Gagnon, the United Supreme Court qualified the entire encounter as “a 
minor occurrence.”206 
Remote and unusual juror concerns do not only exist at the federal 
level.  For instance, the State Supreme Court of Montana reviewed a case 
where an individual juror expressed a concern that if he ruled against the 
county government, his taxes could go up, thus making him hesitant to 
serve in the case of Eklund v. Wheatland County.207  
In Eklund, a citizen was injured while a juvenile tried to escape from 
a detention facility.208  The individual was injured when during a police 
chase the juvenile lost control of his getaway car slamming into Eklund.209  
During the initial trial, summary verdict was granted for one of the 
defendants, Wheatland County.210 Ultimately, reversed and remanded for a 
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second trial, Wheatland County was found not liable by a jury and Eklund 
appealed again.211 
On appeal, Eklund argued that one of the jurors, Butts, expressed a 
concern that he was unable to be impartial in the case.212  Butts was a 
landowner in Wheatland County, and he articulated an unease that if he 
ruled against the government his taxes could be increased to pay the 
judgment.213  Based on this response, Eklund moved to strike the juror for 
cause.214  However, Wheatland objected.215  Both counsels questioned the 
juror further ultimately resulting in the judge denying the cause 
challenge.216  In an abundance of caution, Eklund utilized a preemptory 
challenge and had Butts removed.217 
In evaluating the degree of Butts’ consternation, the trial court 
closely examined how his anxiety about increased taxes was expressed.218  
The court characterized these statements as a “hesitance” focused on the 
size of jury award more than an inability to remain impartial and 
unbiased.219  Additionally, the trial judge seized upon Butt’s statements that 
he “would follow the law and the instructions given to him.”220  The trial 
judge remarked that at no point did the potential juror say that he would be 
unfair. 221 
The Montana Supreme Court found that the trial judge’s decision to 
deny the cause challenge was proper.222  In supporting the decision, the 
appellate court adhered to the principle that great weight must be given to 
the trial judge’s decision as he observes the demeanor and nonverbal cues 
of the jurors in making a decision.223  It should be unusual for an appellate 
court to disturb that assessment based solely on a record on appeal.224  As 
the Montana Supreme Court wrote, “(t)he trial judge stood in the best 
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B. Lack of Sincerity of Concern 
 
Yet, one profound reality exists regarding jury service that must be 
mentioned in this article.  As many judges and litigators agree, one 
commonality amongst juries throughout the country is a lack of desire for 
some to serve.  Whether service is considered an inconvenience or an overt 
repugnance, the bottom line is that people will lie to get out of the 
commitment. In evaluating the veracity of an individual’s juror’s distress, 
it is not simple enough to explore the possibility of an issue but the 
genuineness of the individual juror in expressing the concern to begin with. 
In People v. Wilson, the Colorado Appeals Court reviewed a case 
where the issue of a juror being truthful about his concerns to be impartial 
arose.226 In Wilson, a defendant appealed his conviction for several offenses 
including driving under the influence and reckless driving.227  In the case, 
a gas station attendant reported Wilson for appearing to drive while 
intoxicated.228  Once police responded to the attendant’s call, Wilson was 
seen illegally completing a U-turn in their presence.229  A traffic stop was 
then initiated.230  Wilson appeared to be drunk during the encounter and 
refused to perform field sobriety exercises.231  He was arrested and 
ultimately found guilty at trial.232 
On appeal, Wilson questioned the trial judge’s refusal to grant a 
cause challenge against a specific juror.233  The juror initially wrote on his 
questionnaire prior to his arrival at the courthouse that he did not want to 
serve because of financial reasons.234  This juror had responded in writing 
that he felt he could not be fair and impartial because “he was the sole 
supporter of his household, stating, ‘If I don't work I don't bring in any 
money.’”235  This concern was later followed by an exchange with the judge 
during the voir dire process where he again expressed a desire not to serve 
for financial reasons.236  The court asked if there was anyone who could not 
serve because of “substantial personal, business, or other hardship” to 
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which the juror answered, “’…being self-employed…if I don’t work I don’t 
get paid.’”237 
When the judge still did not remove him from the jury panel, the 
potential juror seized upon an inquiry made by one of the attorneys 
regarding feelings about alcohol use.238  Wilson’s attorney poised the 
following question, 
Some of you have indicated there are circumstances in your 
background, family members who abused alcohol and 
things of that sort. I guess because time is limited, I guess 
I'm just going to ask it this way. Is there anyone who feels 
those kinds of past experiences would affect them in sitting 
as jurors so that they could not be fair, knowing what the 
charges are? Anybody who's concerned about that as an 
issue?239 
The juror’s corresponding answer was as follows: 
I'd say my daughter's mother who's no longer alive due to 
this could account for every one of the counts you've got 
there in your particular client. You can't count that high. You 
don't have enough fingers and toes…. I have too many other 
outside responsibilities plus what I know on a background 
basis as I said, somebody I was close to at one time in my 
life all those counts you've got on your client unfortunately 
she'd have it on [her], so in other words, it would kind of like 
get me on a narrow-minded basis…. I would say he's [your 
client] got a strike against him because I've been around 
enough of it. I've been around too much of it.240 
After the exchange, the defense counsel immediately moved to 
remove the juror for cause.241  A bench conference soon followed where 
the trial judge denied the request.242  As justification for refusing to remove 
the juror, the judge explained that he believed the individual was lying 
simply to be permitted to return to work.243  The prosecution added that the 
answers regarding his feelings about alcohol should have also been 
indicated on the questionnaire if they were valid.244  While the defense 
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statements, he did note that the juror had expressed a clear bias against his 
client.245 
In ruling that the trial judge incorrectly denied the cause challenge, 
the appellate court understood that the sincerity of the juror’s statements 
was lacking.246  Yet, the trial judge was found at fault for not exploring the 
issue further to see if the juror could set aside his concerns and be 
impartial.247  In reaching this decision, the appellate court conceded that a 
juror’s independent motives for providing the answers he or she provides 
are germane to the question of whether they can serve on a case.248  Yet 
doubting a person’s truthfulness does not absolve a court of its 
responsibility to explore the matter ensuring that a party receives a fair 
trial.249 In writing its opinion, the Colorado Court of Appeals announced, 
“a trial court may not deny a defendant's challenge for cause to a 
prospective juror who has expressed bias based solely upon its belief that 
the prospective juror is merely seeking to avoid jury service.”250 
Prior to 2020, most litigators encountering potential jurors claiming 
to fear jury service because of falling ill would believe these individuals 
were either bad liars wanting to avoid jury service or people suffering from 
severe hypochondria.  In either scenario, a cause challenge may have been 
a valid response.  But in a post Covid-10 society, a third option has become 
apparent.  Jurors who are either in high-risk categories or live with family 
in high-risk categories have a legitimate concern of contracting the disease 
while in public.  To these individuals, it falls on court system throughout 
the country to come up with pragmatic solutions to address their concerns.  
Whether a court doubts the rationality or the sincerity of the fear is no 
longer an issue.  Instead, the focus shifts to how to accommodate these 
individuals. 
 
V. PRAGMATIC SUGGESTIONS 
 
Therefore, with this information in hand, it is time to look at the 
specific case of those individuals who fear jury service because of the 
potential of becoming ill by exposure to other individuals.  Even when a 
vaccine has been developed for Covid-19, the next disease may be around 
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There are a few pragmatic suggestions to consider that lesson or potentially 
eliminate the fear of contracting a disease to begin with. 
While at the time of writing this article, approximately ninety-five 
percent of United States’ citizens are under lockdown, at some point 
everyone recognizes that these restrictions will be lifted.251  One idea that 
has been floated by many is the notion of having individuals have their 
temperatures taken before entering buildings.252  Indeed, the happiest place 
on earth, Walt Disney World, has indicated the possibility of taking 
people’s temperatures before permitting entry to their parks.253  Any 
individual having a temperature of 100.4 degrees or higher would be denied 
access.254  Similar health checkpoints could be placed at entrances to 
courthouses.  Only those individuals who are free from fever would be 
granted access. 
A second suggestion is the altering of courtrooms themselves.  
Many jurisdictions only require a six-person jury for most cases but provide 
seating for those rare instances where a twelve-person jury is necessary.  
For those occasions, jurors can sit one seat apart to practice social 
distancing.  Another idea is reorienting the presentation of the case to the 
public seating area which many courtrooms provide in the back of the 
courtroom.  In this scenario, instead of presenting the case to the judge, the 
attorneys would present the case to where the jurors sit.  Coupled with 
efforts at increased cleaning, this could significantly reduce the odds of the 
virus spreading.    
A final idea focuses on better review procedures before potential 
jurors even arrive at the courthouse using more thorough questionnaires.  
For instance, many jurisdictions already permit individuals of a certain age 
automatic excusal of jury service.255  The range is as low as sixty-five in 
such states as Mississippi and South Carolina or as high as eighty in Hawaii 
and South Dakota.256  This age excusal could be lowered to automatically 
exclude those citizens who are in high-risk groups for complications 
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associated with the virus.257  Furthermore, the virus appears to be more 
dangerous to those individuals who suffer from preexisting medical 
conditions.258  Diagnoses such as asthma or diabetes could also become 
grounds for automatic excusal from service for those who are concerned 
about their health.  
Yet, despite these suggestions, the reality is that at some point 
lawyers and judges will inevitably be faced with a potential juror who 
expresses an inability to focus on a case because of a fear of contracting an 
illness.  In those instances, case law does provide us a framework to operate 
to ensure that the parties have a fair trial heard by an impartial jury.  First, 
we know that even if the court believes that there are alternative motives 
behind the statement, such as avoiding jury service, an inquiry must 
occur.259  Precedent also dictates that the wording of the juror’s fear plays 
a vital role in how the judge and attorneys handle the matter.260  In granting 
or rejecting a cause challenge, the language of the juror’s anxiety must be 
clear and unwavering.  It must clearly establish an inability to focus on the 
matter at hand because the fear of becoming ill is so significant and cannot 
be pushed aside.  
Ultimately, the decision to grant a cause challenge is determined on 
a case-by-case basis.  While precedent is indeed helpful, an appellate court 
must pay particular care to the questions, answers, and actions of the juror, 
the judge, and the attorneys.  This is why the one universal we can pull from 
both federal and state case is the weight that the trial court’s discretions 
must have in these situations.261  While the law seems clear that an inquiry 
must occur when a fear is raised to service, the law is equally clear that the 
trial’s judge’s decision will not be disturbed unless clear abuse is found.  
Therefore, it is imperative that all the players in the case ensure that no 
matter how frivolous or farfetched a juror’s anxiety about catching a disease 
appears, the same process is followed for a healthy twenty-one-year-old 
with no preexisting health conditions as it is for a seventy-year-old 
individual who is in a high-risk category for contracting the disease.  Like 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
Ultimately, while the immediate impact of the Coronavirus is self-
evident by closures of court across the country, the lasting impact of how 
attorneys practice law will be felt long after shelter at home orders are lifted. 
With the law being an essential service, monthly moratoriums on court 
hearings are not a long-term solution for a world where the next pandemic 
may pop up in a month’s time.  The focus must always remain on the 
litigants' rights, ensuring that no matter what is happening outside the 
courtroom, jurors are giving their full attention to the issues before them. 
Therefore, as 2020 becomes history and we as a society move 
beyond mandatory stay at home orders, anticipating how we handle the 
fallout from Covid-19 should be a priority for courts across our country.  
Inevitably, concerns about illness and sanitation will spill into courtrooms.  
Judges must be ready to address these fears in efficient but appropriate 
means.  Ultimately, ensuring that all parties get a fair trial rests on the trial 
courts and their discretionary review of potential jurors who appear before 
them. Whether it be legitimate alarm for one’s health or fabricated attempts 
at avoiding jury service, the phrase, “I don’t want to catch something,” will 
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